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AN UNACKNOWLEDGED CONSTITUTIONAL CRISIS: 
UNITED STATES V. SHIPP II (1909) 
LESLIE F. GOLDSTEIN 
According to my dictionary, one type of “crisis” is “[a]n unstable con-
dition in political . . . affairs in which an abrupt or decisive change is impend-
ing.”1  A rarely acknowledged but nonetheless decisive change in the United 
States Supreme Court’s treatment of the U.S. Constitution, as that document 
applied to black Americans, began in 1911.  This Essay argues that the con-
stitutional reset, so to speak, was triggered by a group of incidents amounting 
to critical proportions that occurred between 1900 and 1910.  Two crisis-
inducing events transpired in that decade: (1) a new style of anti-black race 
riots developed in the northern United States and spread to the South; and (2) 
the Supreme Court, for the only time to date, tried a criminal case on original 
jurisdiction.2 
The crime that prompted the trial was contempt of court.  The contempt 
was perpetrated by a lynch mob, including a sheriff and his deputies, who 
committed a murder by lynching a black man whose appeal against his own 
conviction for the rape of a white woman had just been accepted to be heard 
by the U.S. Supreme Court.  This original jurisdiction trial, heard by the 
Fuller Court, was United States v. Shipp (Shipp II).3  As of 2017, one can say 
the Fuller Court has been the most anti-black Supreme Court since the Civil 
War.4  In December 1910, Justice Edward White became the Chief Justice, 
replacing Chief Justice Melville Fuller.5  A noticeable shift took place on the 
White Court and set forth a trajectory that lasted until the 1990s, during which 
the Supreme Court took on a leadership role within the federal government 
to uphold the rights of black Americans. 
The Fuller Court years of 1888–1910 were the post-Civil-War nadir for 
the civil rights of black Americans.  Outright hostility to these rights began 
showing up in both the executive and legislative branches once Grover 
                                                          
2017 © Leslie F. Goldstein. 
 Leslie F. Goldstein, Judge Hugh M. Morris Professor of Political Science Emerita, University 
of Delaware.  This Essay is adapted from an excerpt from my new book, The U.S. Supreme Court 
and Racial Minorities: Two Centuries of Judicial Review on Trial. 
 1.  Crisis, THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY (2d College ed.,1982). 
 2.  See United States v. Shipp, 214 U.S. 386 (1909).  
 3.  214 U.S. 386 (1909).  United States v. Shipp (Shipp I), 203 U.S. 563 (1906) was the deci-
sion allowing the Supreme Court to take jurisdiction on the contempt issue. 
 4.  See infra text accompanying notes 44–45. 
 5.  Justices 1789 to Present, SUP. CT. U.S., https://www.supremecourt.gov/about/mem-
bers_text.aspx (last visited Sept. 10, 2017). 
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Cleveland, a Democrat, was elected President in 1884.6  Prosecutorial efforts 
by President Teddy Roosevelt’s (“T.R.”) Justice Department in 1901–1909 
to bring to justice perpetrators of anti-black violence provided the only bright 
spot in this dismal picture of withdrawal by the President and Congress from 
the black civil rights arena in the twenty-year period of 1891–1910.  Not only 
did T.R. call upon Congress to adopt anti-lynching legislation in his State of 
the Union message of December 1906 (and publicly condemn lynching as 
early as 1902), but his Justice Department also brought successful prosecu-
tions against lynch mobs: Riggins v. United States (1905),7 United States v. 
Shipp (Shipp I) (1906)8, and Shipp II (1909).  The last of these, Shipp II, is 
the original criminal jurisdiction case described above, which, this Essay will 
argue, marked an important turning point in the Supreme Court’s treatment 
of the Constitution.   
Lynch mob prosecutions were the only occasions on which the Fuller 
Court upheld rights of black Americans.9  T.R.’s unsuccessful prosecutions 
included efforts that prosecuted, with some initial success, individuals who 
forced black persons into “peonage” (compelled labor to pay off a claim of a 
debt) and mobs that were terrorizing blacks into abandoning their jobs.  These 
efforts, however, were thwarted by the Fuller Court in Clyatt v. United States 
(1905)10, Hodges v. United States (1906)11, and Boyett v. United States 
(1907).12 
                                                          
 6.  For details, see LESLIE F. GOLDSTEIN, THE U.S. SUPREME COURT AND RACIAL 
MINORITIES: TWO CENTURIES OF JUDICIAL REVIEW ON TRIAL 127 (2017).  Cleveland stopped fed-
eral efforts to enforce voting rights in the South, and Congress in 1894 legislatively undid the ex-
plicit voting rights protections it had adopted in the Reconstruction Era.  Id. at 128.  Congress made 
no effort to invoke Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment when the South began massive disen-
franchisement of Southern black voters in the 1890s (which it successfully completed in the early 
twentieth century).  Id. at 128–29.  Also, Congress ignored T.R.’s call for anti-lynching legislation.  
Id. at 129–30. 
 7.  199 U.S. 547 (1905). 
 8.  203 U.S. 563 (1906). 
 9.  To be sure, the Fuller Court, in Clyatt v. United States, refrained from declaring unconsti-
tutional the Federal Anti-Peonage Act of 1867, ch. 187, 14 Stat. 546, but in that case the Court 
ordered the release of a man accused of holding a black man in peonage servitude.  197 U.S. 207, 
216, 222 (1905).  And in 1908, the Fuller Court resisted T.R.’s Justice Department’s pleas to issue 
a pre-trial release of a black man jailed under an Alabama peonage (debt-servitude) law.  Bailey v. 
Alabama, 211 U.S. 452, 453, 455 (1908). 
 10. 197 U.S. 207 (1905). 
 11. 203 U.S. 1 (1906). 
 12.  207 U.S. 581 (1907) (per curiam).  Detailed discussion of these three cases is provided in 
the following sources: OWEN M. FISS, 8 THE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES DEVISE: HISTORY OF THE 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: TROUBLED BEGINNINGS OF THE MODERN STATE, 1888–
1910 379–84 (Stanley N. Katz ed., 1993); J. Gordon Hylton, The Judge Who Abstained in Plessy v. 
Ferguson: Justice David Brewer and the Problem of Race, 61 MISS. L.J. 315, 320 n.21 (1991); 
Pamela S. Karlan, Contracting the Thirteenth Amendment: Hodges v. United States, 85 B.U. L. 
REV. 783 (2005); William H. Pruden III, Hodges v. United States, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ARK. HIST. 
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I.  THE WHITE COURT SHIFT, 1911–1921 
The Supreme Court’s record on civil rights for black Americans took a 
sharp turn for the better in 1911 with the promotion of Justice Edward White 
to Chief Justiceship in December of 1910.13  Scholars continue to debate the 
causes of this turn.  It may have been due to the departure of moderately 
proslavery Chief Justice Melvin Fuller (who died in 1910).14  It could have 
been because of the psychological impact of the Supreme Court actually try-
ing guilty parties for a lynching in 1909 on charges of contempt of court.  
(The sheriff and deputy co-conspirators involved knew that the appeal of the 
man they were about to lynch to death had been accepted for a hearing at the 
U.S. Supreme Court).  It could have been caused by surrounding socio-polit-
ical events.15  Most likely, it was due to a combination of all of these ele-
ments.16 
The cases that comprise what I call this “turn for the better” are de-
scribed in Part II.  In brief, they include two anti-segregation decisions, two 
anti-peonage-law decisions, and three pro-voting rights decisions.  This turn 
by the White Court was hardly to be expected.  The new Chief Justice White 
had served as an officer in the Confederate Army and, in Louisiana, he was 
a politician who led opposition to Reconstruction.17  Vanderbilt Law Review 
                                                          
& CULTURE, http://www.encyclopediaofarkansas.net/encyclopedia/entry-detail.aspx?en-
tryID=7404 (last updated Mar. 28, 2016). 
 13.  See Justices 1789 to Present, infra note 5. 
 14.  Melville Fuller served as the campaign manager for Stephen Douglas’s presidential cam-
paign in 1860.  Melville W. Fuller, OYEZ, http://www.oyez.org/justices/melvin_w_fuller.  While 
Douglas was not as hard-line proslavery in that election as his Southern Democrat opponent 
Breckinridge, he did favor giving permission for the expansion of slavery into the northern states 
via “popular sovereignty,” and he did manage a large slavery plantation inherited by his wife and 
children from 1848 until his death in 1861.  For his management, he received one-third of the profits 
of the plantation each year.  Deborah Keating, Stephen A. Douglas, in CIVIL WAR ON THE WESTERN 
BORDER: THE MISSOURI-KANSAS CONFLICT, 1854–1865, THE KANSAS CITY PUBLIC LIBRARY 
http://www.civilwaronthewesternborder.org/encyclopedia/douglas-stephen (last visited Oct. 23, 
2017).  
Fuller lived in Chicago and did not own slaves.  He never served in the Union army and was 
accused by political opponents of having been a Copperhead during the war, based on his suppos-
edly soft votes while serving in the Illinois legislature. WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, CENTENNIAL 
CRISIS: THE DISPUTED ELECTION OF 1876, at 226 (2004). 
 15.  See infra text accompanying notes 31–39 (discussing the “northern style race riots”). 
 16.  So far as I know, no previous scholar has suggested that presiding on original jurisdiction 
over a trial for “contempt of court,” the federal charge imposed upon this murder by lynching, 
shaped the Court’s jurisdiction in the immediately subsequent decades.  See text accompanying 
supra note 3 and infra note 47. 
 17.  See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL & BENNO C. SCHMIDT, JR., 9 THE OLIVER WENDELL 
HOLMES DEVISE: HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: THE JUDICIARY AND 
RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT 1910–1921, at 725–26 (Paul A. Freund & Stanley Katz eds., 1984) 
(This Article only cites to Part II of this book written by Benno C. Schmidt, Jr. and will be referred 
to hereinafter as SCHMIDT in each supra).  Schmidt writes that in the twentieth-century White Court, 
“it was the best of times black people had as yet seen.”  Id. at 726.  This statement undervalues 
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presented a symposium on these cases in 1998 and after reflecting upon the 
other symposium papers and the cases, one scholar concluded, “[i]n the 
end . . . the[se] Progressive era decisions remain a puzzle.”18 
In the years 1909–1912, Justices Brewer, Fuller, Peckham, Moody, and 
(pro-civil-rights) Harlan all left the Court.19  And, there was considerable fur-
ther turnover during the early twentieth century.  T.R. appointed Justices Ol-
iver Wendell Holmes (GOP Mass., 1902–1932), William Day (GOP Ohio, 
1903–1922), and William Moody (GOP Mass., 1906–1910).20  President Taft 
(GOP Ohio, 1909–1913) appointed Justices Horace Lurton (Dem. Tenn., 
1909–1914), Charles E. Hughes (GOP N.Y., 1910–1916), Willis Van De-
vanter (GOP Wyo., 1910–1937), Joseph Lamar (Dem. Ga., 1910–1916), and 
Mahlon Pitney (GOP N.J., 1912–1922), and promoted Justice Edward White 
to Chief Justiceship in 1910.21  President Wilson (Dem. N.J., 1913–1921), 
who imposed racial segregation on federal civil service jobs and halted the 
postbellum practice of appointing blacks to patronage jobs,22 appointed Jus-
tices James McReynolds (Dem. Tenn., 1914–1941), Louis D. Brandeis 
(Dem. Mass., 1916–1939), and John Clarke (Dem. Ohio, 1916–1922).23  Eco-
nomic, rather than racially sensitive, concerns seemed to dominate the presi-
dential selection process of those years: T.R.’s picks had been dominated, in 
his words, by a desire to find “a liberal-minded man, a man with sympathy 
for the position of labor . . . a man who is not . . . scared . . . from exercising 
the proper control over corporations.”24  Taft, by contrast, sought men with 
the right sort of conservative “creeds on property.”25  In contrast to the Fuller 
Court, however, neither the Court under Chief Justice White nor the Court 
under later Chief Justice Taft gave rise to someone like the first Justice John 
Marshall Harlan, who stood out as the voice for racial justice on the Fuller 
Court.  Although the appointment of Progressive Justice Charles Hughes to 
the White Court was particularly important, personnel changes alone cannot 
                                                          
contributions of both the Chase and Waite Courts, but there can be no doubt that the White Court 
proved a dramatic improvement over the Fuller Court.  See also JOHN R. HOWARD, THE SHIFTING 
WIND: THE SUPREME COURT AND CIVIL RIGHTS FROM RECONSTRUCTION TO BROWN 161 (1999).  
 18.  Mark V. Tushnet, Progressive Era Race Relations Cases in Their “Traditional” Context, 
51 VAND. L. REV. 993, 1000 (1998). 
 19.  Justices 1789 to Present, supra note 5. 
 20.  Id. 
 21.  Id. 
 22.  SCHMIDT, supra note 17, at 937–38. 
 23.  Justices 1789 to Present, supra note 5. 
 24.  SCHMIDT, supra note 17, at 7 (citing Letter from Theodore Roosevelt to W. H. Moody 
(June 5, 1907) (on file with Alexander Bickel)); HOWARD, supra note 17, at 162. 
 25.  SCHMIDT, supra note 17, at 5–6.  Note that Taft did not believe he was basing his decisions 
on views of property.  Id. 
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fully account for that Court’s clearly discernible judicial shift on race, modest 
though it was.26 
One must consider the changing times as at least part of the equation.27  
Among more educated or affluent whites and among some union women, the 
women’s suffrage movement was in full swing, and Progressivism was in 
flower among white middle class voters.  Despite his privately expressed 
views on inherent racial inequality, (Progressive) President Theodore Roose-
velt used his Justice Department to bring several cases on behalf of minority 
rights, as was adumbrated above, although most were blocked by the con-
servative Fuller Court.28  In terms of working class life during this period, 
both industrialization and immigration were at peak levels. 
Unfortunately, the latter trend, immigration, seemed to have triggered a 
rash of northern race riots during the period of 1898–1908, in which mobs of 
working class whites attacked and even killed random black Americans and 
set fire to black neighborhoods.  These northern pogroms had been preceded 
by a severe outbreak of post-Reconstruction style violence in 1898 in Wil-
mington, North Carolina, which aimed to discourage black voting and to 
drive elected black leaders to resign from office and leave the city.  Some-
where between 14 and 60 blacks were murdered and some 1400 others moved 
out of the city.29 
In 1898–1899, racial violence moved north, beginning with a flurry of 
coal mine riots in three different Illinois towns.  Armed union members on 
strike confronted management’s armed guards defending Southern blacks 
who had been recruited as strikebreakers.  These clashes produced the deaths 
of several blacks, but (for what it is worth) the mob fury was plainly job 
related.30 
                                                          
 26.  Cf. HOWARD, supra note 17, at 160–67.  Howard attributes the Court’s relatively progres-
sive record of 1911–1917 to new personnel, specifically, the presence of Charles Evans Hughes, 
who had the intellectual heft and commitment to racial justice to outweigh the strong intellectual 
force of Oliver Wendell Holmes.  Id. at 165–67.  The latter (despite his reputation as a “liberal”) 
was so strongly committed to deference to local majorities that he frequently voted against black 
litigants.  Id. at 167.  Howard is no doubt correct as to the direction of Hughes’s influence, but 
Hughes left the Court in 1916, a year prior to the White Court’s striking down a segregation ordi-
nance in Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917).  See infra text accompanying notes 86–101. 
 27.  Cf.  MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT 
AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 67 (2004).  Klarman debunks the idea that the “times” 
were supportive of racial reform: “The political nadir of race relations at the national level may have 
come in the 1912 presidential election and its aftermath.”  Id.  Presidential candidates Taft and T.R. 
both endorsed Southern home rule on race, and Woodrow Wilson, who won, was a committed 
Southern Democrat, having resided in the South for the first twenty-eight years of his life.  
 28.  See supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
 29.  KLARMAN, supra note 27, at 11, 15, 38; LeRae Umfleet, The Wilmington Race Riot—1898, 
N.C.PEDIA (Sept. 17, 2010), http://ncpedia.org/history/cw-1900/wilmington-race-riot. 
 30.  John A. Lupton, Virden, Pana, and Carterville (Illinois) Mine Riots (1898–1899), in 2 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN RACE RIOTS 671, 671–75 (Walter Rucker & James Nathaniel Upton 
eds., 2007). 
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The race-based riots of the first decade of the twentieth century accom-
panied the increasing stream of black migration into the North.31  Whether 
these riots were motivated by an underlying sense of competition over jobs,32 
or by a cultural clash between rural blacks and staid Midwestern townsfolk,33 
or simply by amorphous racial hostility,34 their common pattern was an im-
mediate triggering by the formation of a would-be lynch mob, agitated over 
a black-on-white crime.  The first riot was in 1900 in New York City, and 
was set off by the killing of a white, plainclothes policeman by a black man 
acting in self-defense; many blacks were injured to the point of hospitaliza-
tion.35  This type of race riot—i.e., one not aimed at disenfranchising blacks 
or at strikebreakers, but triggered by a lynch mob—then recurred in Evans-
ville, Indiana, in 1903;36 Springfield, Ohio, in 1904 and 1906;37 Greensburg, 
Indiana, in 1906;38 and Springfield, Illinois, in 1908.39  The same pattern 
spread to the South, occurring in 1900, in New Orleans, Louisiana40; in 1904, 
in Statesboro, Georgia41; and in 1906, in Atlanta, Georgia.42  Then in July of 
1910, a new round of race riots broke out in numerous cities in response to 
the heavyweight championship victory of black boxer Jack Johnson over 
                                                          
 31.  Black migrants to the North numbered 49,000 in the 1870s; 62,000 in the 1880s; 132,000 
in the 1890s; and 143,000 in the 1900–1909 decade.  KLARMAN, supra note 27, at 12.  
 32.  This is the thesis of KLARMAN, supra note 27, at 64.  
 33.  This is the thesis of BRIAN BUTLER, AN UNDERGROWTH OF FOLLY: PUBLIC ORDER, RACE 
ANXIETY, AND THE 1903 EVANSVILLE, INDIANA RIOT 6–14 (2000).  The account of the Springfield, 
Illinois riot, by Roberta Senechal, lends Butler’s thesis some support but ultimately rejects it.  Her 
conclusion seems to point the finger at amorphous racial hostility, which she phrases in terms of 
white resentment at black success, harbored not by foreign immigrants or by Southern migrants, but 
by natives of Illinois who held secure jobs.  Roberta Senechal, The Springfield Race Riot of 1908, 
PERIODICALS ONLINE, http://www.lib.niu.edu/1996/iht329622.html (last visited Mar. 29, 2014). 
 34.  See Senechal, supra note 33. 
 35.  Ann V. Collins, New York City Riot of 1900, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN RACE 
RIOTS, supra note 30, at 474–76. 
 36.  BUTLER, supra note 33, at 7; Jack Blocker, Vice and Violence, H-NET REVIEWS (2002), 
http://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=5848 (reviewing BUTLER, supra note 33). 
 37.  JOHN HOPE FRANKLIN & ALFRED A. MOSS, FROM SLAVERY TO FREEDOM: A HISTORY OF 
AFRICAN AMERICANS 316 (7th ed. 1994); Springfield, Ohio, Racial Conflicts, OHIO HIST. 
CONNECTION, http://www.ohiohistorycentral.org/w/Springfield,_Ohio,_Racial_Con-
flicts?rec=2100 (last visited Mar. 29, 2014). 
 38.  PETER M. BERGMAN, THE CHRONOLOGICAL HISTORY OF THE NEGRO IN AMERICA 347 
(1969); FRANKLIN & MOSS, supra note 37, at 316. 
 39.  FRANKLIN & MOSS, supra note 37, at 316–19; Senechal, supra note 33.  This riot received 
extensive press coverage and provoked the formation of the NAACP.  FRANKLIN & MOSS, supra 
note 37, at 318–19. 
 40.  WILLIAM IVY HAIR, CARNIVAL OF FURY: ROBERT CHARLES AND THE NEW ORLEANS 
RACE RIOT OF 1900, at 152–53, 175–77 (1976). 
 41.  FRANKLIN & MOSS, supra note 37, at 313. 
 42.  HOWARD, supra note 17, at 159; Gregory Mixon & Clifford Kuhn, Atlanta Race Riot of 
1906, NEW GA. ENCYCLOPEDIA (Oct. 29, 2015), http://www.georgiaencyclopedia.org/articles/his-
tory-archaeology/atlanta-race-riot-1906.  
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“Great White Hope” Jim Jeffries.  This wave of riots produced twenty-six 
deaths.43 
Apart from the three lynching-related cases—Riggins (1905), Shipp I 
(1906), and Shipp II (1909)—the Fuller Court produced no other decisions 
truly favorable to black Americans.44  The Fuller Court basically ratified the 
South’s disfranchisement of blacks and exclusion of them from jury access.  
They did so by turning down appeals from Southern blacks in numerous cases 
of blatant denials of rights over a twenty-year period.45  The Supreme Court 
under Chief Justice White, by contrast, immediately produced a different out-
come in the next peonage case: Bailey v. Alabama (Bailey II) (1911).46  This 
decision was followed by several pro-civil-rights decisions in the ensuing 
decade. 
The timing of this critical turning point makes it hard to resist the sur-
mise that the Supreme Court’s taking upon itself, in 1909, the trial and con-
viction for contempt of court of the Shipp co-conspirators was an unusually 
intense experience for the Justices.  At no other time has the U.S. Supreme 
Court conducted a criminal trial.47  Shipp II took place a year after the sizable 
Springfield, Illinois, race riot that received extensive, nation-wide publicity.  
Then, the year after the lynching trial at the Court, came the national wave of 
race riots in July 1910, provoked by the victory of black boxer Jack Johnson 
in “The Fight of the Century.”48  Six months later, in January 1911, the White 
Court handed down Bailey II. 
It is also therefore hard to resist the surmise that a lingering effect from 
the Shipp II decision, exacerbated by judicial awareness of a decade of race 
rioting that had spread to the Northern states, pushed the Court’s turn toward 
decisions upholding constitutional rights for black Americans.  Lynch law 
and mob rule directly threatened the very structure of legal order.  At some 
point (one suspects) the Justices had to resist.  At the time of Bailey II (1911), 
the first time since 1884 that the Court in a non-lynching case supported black 
rights,49 five Justices, who had participated in the 1909 conviction of Shipp 
                                                          
 43.  Racism Takes a Blow in Reno, INT’L BOXING HALL OF FAME, 
http://www.ibhof.com/pages/archives/johnsonjeffries.html (last visited May 22, 2014); JP, A 
Boxer’s Unforgivable Brashness: The Champ Who Dared to be Black, SELVEDGE YARD, (Jan. 9, 
2011), http://selvedgeyard.com/2011/01/09/a-boxers-unforgivable-brashness-the-champ-who-
dared-to-be-black/. 
 44.  See supra note 9.  
 45.  For a comprehensive list, see GOLDSTEIN, supra note 6, at 184–88.  For a description of 
the rejected appeals cases of southern blacks, see id. at 127–41. 
 46.  219 U.S. 219 (1911) (finding Alabama peonage laws unconstitutional). 
 47.  Mark Curriden, A Supreme Case of Contempt, A.B.A.J. (June 2009), http://www.abajour-
nal.com/magazine/article/a_supreme_case_of_contempt. 
 48. JP, supra note 43. 
 49.  There were a couple of jury selection cases in the early 1900s where the Fuller Court went 
so far as to remand to the state courts to ask them to consider whether the jury selection system 
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and his co-lynchers for contempt of court, remained on the Court: Justices 
Harlan, McKenna, Holmes, Day, and White.50  Newly added to their ranks in 
1910 was the progressive on race, Justice Charles Evans Hughes.51 
II. JUDICIAL GOOD NEWS FOR BLACKS ON PEONAGE, SEGREGATION, AND 
VOTING (1911–1917) 
Alonzo Bailey first brought his case to the U.S. Supreme Court in 1908, 
the year before the lyncher Shipp’s contempt of court trial there.52  Bailey 
was the imprisoned victim of an Alabama law that presumed guilt (subject to 
rebuttal by factual evidence) for the crime of fraudulent larceny from the 
breaking of a labor contract that paid wages in advance.53  After having com-
mitted himself to work for one year beginning December 26, 1907, and re-
ceiving $15 at signing with the promise of $12 per month pay (from which 
$1.25 would be deducted to pay back his advance, until it was fully paid), 
Bailey walked away from the job in February 1908.54  The law made Bailey’s 
departure prima facie evidence of intentional larcenous fraud and did not al-
low his testimony for rebuttal as to his actual motives.55  Jailed prior to the 
criminal trial, Bailey sued for a writ of habeas corpus on the grounds the law 
violated both the Thirteenth Amendment and the federal Anti-Peonage 
Law.56  His plea was rejected by the Alabama courts and, despite support in 
an amicus brief from Teddy Roosevelt’s Justice Department, Bailey’s 1908 
lawsuit on a writ of error to the Fuller Supreme Court lost in a 7-2 decision 
written by Justice Holmes, with a dissent by Justice Harlan (Justice Day con-
curred).57 
When the case again reached the Court under Chief Justice White in 
1911,58 the results were diametrically the opposite: a 5-2 (with two seats va-
cant) decision for Bailey, with Justice Holmes, the Bailey I opinion author, 
now in dissent (along with Justice Lurton).59  By this time, Bailey had been 
                                                          
(deployed by those very state courts) had been racially biased, but the U.S. Supreme Court itself did 
not find racial bias in any jury case from 1884 through 1922.  In 1883, the Waite Court had thrown 
out a murder indictment on the grounds of racial bias in jury selection in Bush v. Kentucky, 107 U.S. 
110 (1883).  The 1884 (Waite Court) case upholding black civil rights was Ex Parte Yarborough, 
110 U.S. 651 (1884).  See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 6, at 121–22.  
 50.  Justices 1789 to Present, supra note 5.  
 51.  See id.; see also supra text accompanying note 26 (discussing Hughes’s racial liberalism). 
 52.  Bailey v. Alabama (Bailey I), 211 U.S 452 (1908). 
 53.  Id. at 455 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 54.  Bailey II, 219 U.S. 219, 227–29 (1911). 
 55.  Id. at 233, 236. 
 56.  Id. at 227–29. 
 57.  Bailey I, 211 U.S. at 455 (majority opinion). 
 58.  Bailey II, 219 U.S. at 219. 
 59.  Chief Justice White’s vacated Associate Justice seat was to be taken by appointee Van 
Devanter and retired Justice Moody’s seat was to be taken by Justice Lamar, but these appointees 
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tried, found guilty of fraud, and sentenced for the $13.75 he still owed his 
employer.  Bailey was to pay a fine and court costs totaling $76.40, or if 
unable to pay, which was the situation, to serve 136 days of imprisonment at 
hard labor.60  The Court ruled unconstitutional the law under which Bailey 
was arrested and imprisoned.  The Court found it violated the Thirteenth 
Amendment (as well as federal statute) by virtue of imposing compulsory 
labor to pay off a debt, rather than leaving the lender the normal remedy of a 
lawsuit for damages to recover a debt.61 
This law was part of a web of Southern laws that subjected workers, 
particularly but not exclusively black workers, to forced labor.  One such law 
made it criminal to fall into the grouping “‘[r]ogues and vagabonds, idle or 
dissolute persons,’ including . . . ‘[p]ersons who neglect their calling,’ [or] 
‘all able-bodied male persons over eighteen years of age who are without 
means of support.’”62  This 1905 Florida statute imposed on such “criminals” 
a $250 fine (which generally they could not pay) or six months on the chain 
gang.63 
The chain gang system of convict labor was often described by muck-
raker journalists as worse than chattel slavery.  Workers were shackled to one 
another by chains even during sleep, forced to work vigorously and at pain 
of frequent and savagely brutal whippings from the leaser of the labor, and 
promptly killed if they attempted escape.  Annual death rates of workers un-
der this system were typically twenty percent and in some places reached 
fifty percent.64 
Related laws on the books kept blacks in unofficial bondage, including 
laws forbidding one employer from enticing a worker away from another em-
ployer who had the worker under a contract.  Lack of an annual contract sub-
jected laborers to the vagrancy laws just described.65  Another set of laws in 
the peonage web, which was to come before the Court in United States v. 
Reynolds66 in 1914, comprised so-called “criminal surety laws.”67  These 
laws permitted convicts, too poor to pay their fines, to avoid the chain gang 
by contracting themselves into servitude for a fixed period to a private person 
who would pay their fine.  Again, combined with dragnet vagrancy laws, this 
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made it possible to trump up charges against blacks and then sentence them 
to involuntary servitude.68 
Muckrakers, conscientious Southern judges, and the Theodore Roose-
velt Administration (assisted behind the scenes by funding for publicity and 
litigation from Booker T. Washington and his allies)69 launched a campaign 
at the turn of the century against the peonage system, stimulated inter alia by 
revelations that white immigrants by the hundreds also were getting caught 
up in its snares.70  Federal Justice Department prosecutions, which numbered 
more than one hundred between 1901 and 1905, ran into something of a brick 
wall at the Fuller Court.  The most this Court would concede (in the Clyatt 
case in 1905)71 was that the 1867 federal Anti-Peonage Law was not uncon-
stitutional.  Despite the issuance of scathing reports from Assistant Attorney 
General Charles Russell in the 1906–1908 period, the Fuller Court used tech-
nicalities to set free a convicted perpetrator of peonage (Clyatt); to let a vic-
tim of an unconstitutional peonage law be held in jail for three years (Bailey 
I)72; and to set free southern white gangs convicted of violently intimidating 
blacks into abandoning well-paying jobs (Hodges).73 
This pattern changed noticeably under the White Court with Bailey II,74 
and the Taft Administration then continued the pursuit of peonage convic-
tions, succeeding again with United States v. Reynolds in 1914.75  The Taft 
Justice Department began the prosecution, which became bogged down dur-
ing the change of administration to Democratic President Woodrow Wilson, 
no friend of black civil rights.  President Wilson’s Justice Department did 
carry the case to completion, by way of a brief that carefully distinguished 
between the private criminal surety system and the state-run, chain-gang con-
vict leasing system, which the Wilson Administration wanted to leave in the 
discretion of the states.76 
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The Reynolds case began with the conviction of Ed Rivers (a black man) 
in Alabama for the crime of petty larceny.77  He was fined $15 plus court 
costs of $43.75, for a total of $58.75.  Since he was indigent, he was sen-
tenced to fifty-eight days hard labor to pay the court what he owed.  A private 
individual, J.A. Reynolds, paid the $58.75 to the court, for which he received 
a commitment from Rivers to work for him for nine months and twenty-eight 
days (approximately five times the duration of his hard labor on the chain 
gang).  Rivers would additionally receive $6 per month plus room, board and 
clothing.  After a month, Rivers quit the job and was then jailed for failure to 
perform his “surety contract.”  This time the judge imposed court costs of 
$87.05, which resulted in a sentence of 115 days on the chain gang, double 
his original sentence.  To avoid the second sentence, Rivers accepted a sec-
ond surety contract with an F.W. Broughton for fourteen and a half months 
labor at $6 per month.78   
At this point, the case brought Broughton and Reynolds into a group of 
eleven persons indicted by a federal grand jury convened by the U.S. Attor-
ney General.  The attorney general of Alabama and the U.S. Attorney General 
were eager to have a quickly resolved test case to settle the issue of the con-
stitutionality of the criminal surety system, but negotiations for such a test 
case dragged on for two years amongst the attorneys, defendants’ counsel, 
and a member of Congress from Alabama, asWoodrow Wilson came into the 
Presidency and appointed a new Attorney General.  Eventually, Reynolds 
and Broughton conceded their participation in a criminal surety arrangement 
but contended that the Alabama system did not violate the Thirteenth Amend-
ment, since it involved servitude as punishment for a crime rather than as 
payment for a debt (which would be forbidden by the Bailey II precedent).79 
Justice Day wrote the opinion in United States v. Reynolds for a unani-
mous Court.  The man who served as surety to the state, who received a 
promise of labor in return, was really receiving the labor of someone who 
was under compulsion to labor in order to pay off his debt to the private surety 
person.  Therefore the logic of Bailey II covered this case, and thus, criminal 
surety systems violated the Thirteenth Amendment.  Justice Holmes, who 
had dissented in Bailey II wrote a brief, grudging concurrence that referred 
to victims of the southern surety system (nearly all of whom were black peo-
ple, although he did not state this fact) as “impulsive people with little intel-
ligence or foresight.”80 
While Presidents Theodore Roosevelt and William H. Taft were united 
with the Supreme Court in opposing peonage, Congress remained in the grip 
                                                          
 77.  235 U.S. at 139. 
 78.  Id. 
 79.  SCHMIDT, supra note 17, at 876–86. 
 80.  Reynolds, 235 U.S. at 150 (Holmes, J., concurring). 
 2017] AN UNACKNOWLEDGED CONSTITUTIONAL CRISIS 211 
 
of the mentality of the worst elements of the South.  It refused Taft’s Justice 
Department’s requests to broaden the Federal Anti-Peonage Law in 1911, so 
that indebtedness would not be a required element to prove peonage such that 
there would be a specified federal penalty for any coercing of labor by a pri-
vate person, on the grounds that it imposed involuntary servitude.81 
Similarly, even after the Shipp II trial at the Supreme Court in 1909, and 
after active lobbying by the newly formed NAACP, Congress continued re-
fusing to pass anti-lynching legislation.  Theodore Roosevelt had advocated 
such legislation as early as 1906, but President Taft, while willing to de-
nounce the lawlessness of lynching, did so from the passive position that it 
would be cured only by self-reform at the local level on the part of sheriffs, 
judges, and juries.82 
Peonage was not the only civil rights problem on which the White Court 
took a progressive turn.  The post-bellum Chase Court (of the 1860s–early 
1870s) had dealt with a “separate but equal” argument with a level of insight 
not to be seen again for many decades, except in dissents by Justice Harlan.  
In Railroad Co. v. Brown,83 the Chase Court ruled that the railroad company’s 
provision requiring physically identical facilities for whites and blacks, while 
forcing them to be separated, failed to satisfy the federal law covering the 
District of Columbia: “[N]o person shall be excluded from the cars on ac-
count of color.”84  Justice Davis’s opinion for the unanimous court linked 
railroad racial segregation to the era of black servitude, thereby implicating 
enforcement powers under the Thirteenth Amendment. 
This sensible insight was lost on the Fuller Court majority, against 
which Justice Harlan then dissented in Plessy v. Ferguson.85  Even before 
Plessy, as early as 1890, the Fuller Court had already indicated its preference 
for separate but equal in interstate travel decisions (over Justice Harlan’s dis-
sents).  It upheld a state mandate of segregated railroad cars against claims 
that this interfered with the dormant commerce power of Congress.86  The 
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extreme tokenism of the Fuller Court’s understanding of “equal” in “equal 
protection of the laws” was indicated in an 1899 decision in which the Jus-
tices upheld the decision of the school board of Richmond County, Georgia 
to close its only public high school for blacks.87  The school board kept open 
one school for white girls and continued to subsidize a church-run high 
school for white males (in a context where three church-run high schools, not 
state assisted, were available for blacks to attend).88 
With the Fuller Court having given its stamp of approval to legally man-
dated segregation in schools and in public transportation, Southern cities be-
gan to enact laws that would segregate residential neighborhoods by race.  In 
December 1910, Baltimore, Maryland, enacted the first law.  It was followed 
within a year by three cities: Mooresville and Winston-Salem in North Car-
olina, and Greenville, South Carolina.  In 1913, pursuant to a Virginia state 
law created the year before explicitly permitting such municipal ordinances, 
five Virginia cities followed suit: Richmond, Norfolk, Roanoke, Ashland, 
and Portsmouth.  Also in 1913, Atlanta, Georgia; Madisonville, Kentucky; 
Birmingham, Alabama; and Asheville, North Carolina, joined the trend.  In 
1914, Louisville, Kentucky, followed suit, and by the end of 1916, Dallas, 
Texas; St. Louis, Missouri; Oklahoma City, and New Orleans had also.89 
The 1910s decade was also the period during which Southern legisla-
tures acted to legislate Jim Crow rules for the minutiae of daily life: Laws 
established separate toilets, separate worker entrances and water buckets, 
separate waiting rooms for trains, separate nurses for white patients and black 
patients, etc.90 
By April of 1916, a constitutional challenge to the Louisville, Kentucky, 
neighborhood segregation ordinance had reached the U.S. Supreme Court for 
oral argument, but the decision in that case, Buchanan v. Warley,91 was not 
handed down until November of 1917.  Justice Day had been ill during the 
argument, and there was also one seat vacant.  In April 1917, the case was 
re-argued, with Day now back in his seat and with the formerly vacant seat 
filled by Justice Brandeis.  Justice Hughes had left the Court and been-
replaced by Justice Clarke.  The law at issue in Buchanan prohibited blacks 
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from residing on blocks where a majority of the residents were white and vice 
versa.92 
Three years earlier, the White Court handed down a transportation prec-
edent that foretold a turn away from Fuller Court pro-segregation decisions.  
This decision, McCabe v. Atchison Railway Co.,93 had dealt with an Okla-
homa law requiring common carriers (in intrastate travel) to provide separate 
coaches for “white and negro races” that were equal in “comfort and conven-
ience,” but sleeping, dining, and parlor cars were permitted to be used “ex-
clusively” by one race and did not have to be provided for the other race if 
this other race (i.e. blacks) did not use them in high enough numbers to make 
them profitable for the railroad.94  The Court, in a 5-4 opinion penned by 
Justice Hughes, had rejected Oklahoma’s defense of the law as a practical 
accommodation to social reality.95  While the opinion accepted the authority 
of Plessy v. Ferguson as to the constitutionality of a “separate but equal” 
requirement in law, it rejected the claim of Oklahoma that states were free to 
legislate in favor of unequal facilities because of disproportionate group us-
age.96  (In principle, this logic could be deployed against Southern states that 
provided no, or very few, high schools for black youths.  Such a pattern was 
prevalent all over the South.)  Hughes announced for five Justices that a con-
stitutional right cannot “depend upon the number of persons . . . discrimi-
nated against.”97  Every “individual . . . is entitled to the equal protection of 
the laws.”98  The McCabe decision, however, had produced no injunction, 
because all nine Justices agreed that the case was unripe; none of the litigants 
indicated that he was attempting, or about to attempt, to travel first class on 
a train in Oklahoma.  They did not yet stand to gain individually and con-
cretely from any Court injunction on the subject. 
Buchanan v. Warley followed McCabe’s segregation limiting trajectory.  
With Hughes no longer on the Court, Justice Day wrote the decision.99  The 
case arrived at the U.S. Supreme Court for the settlement of a dispute ar-
ranged by the Kentucky NAACP.100  Warley (a black man) bought, but did 
not fully pay for, property on a majority white block from a friendly realtor, 
Buchanan.  Warley then refused to make full payment because of legal inca-
pacity to build a home for himself on the property (being prohibited from 
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residing on a majority white block).101  Buchanan sued to get the money 
(technically, “specific performance of [the] contract”) by a judicial declara-
tion that the segregation law was void.102  Kentucky courts upheld the ordi-
nance on the grounds that separating the races promotes public welfare (the 
very ground that had succeeded in Plessy).103  The White Court unanimously 
declared this residential segregation ordinance unconstitutional.104 
Both the briefs for Buchanan and the Court’s decision emphasize prop-
erty rights, which were the Holy Grail to the majority of the Justices of the 
time.  Justice Day’s opinion for the Court cited Holden v. Hardy105 for the 
principle that under the Fourteenth Amendment, the right to property “in-
cludes the right to acquire, use, and dispose of it.”106  This was both a funda-
mental constitutional right and one that, as a result of the Thirteenth and Four-
teenth Amendments and the civil rights laws enacted to implement them, was 
now protected for both white and black people in the United States, he con-
tinued.107  The precedent of Plessy, the Court insisted, was not to the contrary, 
because that case had not involved deprivation of a property right, but simply 
called for equal (although separate) accommodations in transportation.108  
Justice Day acknowledged “[t]hat there exists a serious and difficult problem 
arising from a feeling of race hostility . . . .”109  Then, in language that would 
be directly quoted four decades later in the only Court opinion ever signed 
by all nine of the Justices,110 he continued with the following:  
It is urged that this proposed segregation will promote the public 
peace by preventing race conflicts.  Desirable as this is, and im-
portant as is the preservation of the public peace, this aim cannot 
be accomplished by laws or ordinances which deny rights created 
or protected by the U.S. Constitution.111 
Unlike the Court’s pro-civil-rights jury decisions of the early 1880s, Bu-
chanan had an immediately lasting impact, at least in a de jure respect.  The 
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wave of residential segregation ordinances petered out.  Maryland tried an-
other version right away, but it was struck down by Maryland courts (as also 
happened with three such laws in the 1920s in Virginia, Texas, and Indiana).  
Later laws from Richmond and New Orleans that reached the U.S. Supreme 
Court were given short shrift in per curiam rulings in 1930 and 1927, respec-
tively.112 
Unfortunately, as the legal reasoning of Buchanan was grounded in 
property rights, its societal impact was limited by property rights.  Privately 
drawn, racially restrictive covenants replaced the residential segregation 
laws, and the former would be ruled enforceable by the Taft Court in Corri-
gan v. Buckley (1926).113  The promise of Buchanan then lay dormant for 
another twenty-two years, until the Court overruled Corrigan in 1948 in Shel-
ley v. Kraemer.114 
Voting was the third topic to which the White Court turned in promoting 
civil rights for black Americans.  Southern blacks, despite the frequency of 
KKK-style violence against them in the immediate post-bellum decades, 
voted in considerable numbers, which fact produced very close elections in 
the Southern states in the 1870s and 1880s.  By the end of the 1890s, five 
Southern states had enacted statutes or state constitution provisions that, as 
applied (and as intended), produced almost total disfranchisement of their 
black citizens.  By 1910, all eleven Confederate states, plus Oklahoma, had 
similarly disfranchised their black citizens.  And at the federal level, the ma-
jority Democrat Congress and Presidency of 1893–1894 wiped off the books 
almost all voting rights enforcement laws.  Despite the ensuing drastic drop 
in voting numbers in the South, later Republican Congresses did nothing to 
apply Section Two of the Fourteenth Amendment to reduce Congressional 
representation in the South to punish those states for these voting re-
strictions.115 
Thus, the elected Congressional representatives of the northern states 
appeared to be comfortable, in the early decades of the twentieth century, 
with this de facto suspension of the Fifteenth Amendment for Southern 
blacks.  This author’s recent book provides the appalling details of the Fuller 
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Court’s repeated demonstrations that it was utterly unwilling to uphold vot-
ing rights or jury rights (which were often tied to voting rights by statute) for 
black Americans.116  In the voting rights arena, too, the White Court provided 
an unexpected contrast. 
Southern state legislatures and constitutional conventions knew that the 
literacy requirements, “understanding” clauses and poll taxes, they were im-
posing at the turn of the century would disfranchise numerous white voters, 
along with blacks.  To counteract this impact, the lawmakers adopted a num-
ber of workarounds available to whites—for instance, registration during a 
narrowly constricted time of year during which registrars would simply turn 
blacks away, irrespective of qualification, and after which new, absurdly 
stringent registration requirements would apply forever.  Another of these 
mechanisms was the grandfather clause—e.g., adult male resident citizens 
would be eligible to vote only if they could read and interpret correctly the 
most opaque sections of the state constitution, or if they had been themselves 
eligible to vote before 1867, or their fathers or grandfathers had been eligible 
to vote then, or if they were foreign-born naturalized male citizens or their 
descendants.  Such clauses were inserted into voting rules in the state consti-
tutions of Louisiana (1898), North Carolina (1900), Georgia (1908), and 
Maryland (1908).  Alabama (1901) and Virginia (1902) grandfathered in per-
sons who had fought in the Civil War or prior wars.  These two states, and 
some others in later statutes, concerned with eliminating the mixed-race off-
spring of white slave owners and their descendants, specified in the grandfa-
ther clauses the term “lawful” descendants.117 
Oklahoma, one of the states whose grandfather clause reached the U.S. 
Supreme Court, entered the Union in 1907 and was a state with two viable 
political parties.  In a transparent effort to disfranchise the black voters (9% 
of the electorate), because they voted Republican, the Democrats in 1910 
pushed through, via a popular referendum prior to the general election, a con-
stitutional amendment that restricted voting registration to two groups: those 
adult male residents who could “read and write any section” of the state con-
stitution, and those male residents who themselves, prior to 1866, had been 
entitled to vote or had resided in a foreign country, or else were “lineal de-
scendant[s]” of such a person.  The Democratic governor instructed election 
inspectors to bar blacks from voting; the orders were followed; many thou-
sands of blacks were kept from voting.118 
Two prominent Oklahoma Republican officials pressed the U.S. Attor-
ney General (under President Taft) to arrest and charge election officials with 
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violating the remaining U.S. civil rights statutes.  These, in general terms 
with no specific reference to voting, criminalized conspiracy to “injure” the 
exercise of constitutional rights.  With Taft’s approval, the U.S. Attorney 
General refused to prosecute, on the grounds that these provisions dealt with 
“civil” rights and not with the “political” right of voting.  One of the Oklaho-
mans frustrated in his request for federal action, John Embry, was a U.S. At-
torney himself, so he went ahead on his own and brought charges against two 
local election officials, J.J. Beal and Frank Guinn.  Taft’s Attorney General 
was furious, but Embry threatened to resign publicly rather than withdraw 
the charges.  The Taft Justice Department [mis]calculated that Oklahoma ju-
ries would be unlikely to convict and wanted to avoid the embarrassment of 
a public resignation, so it let the case proceed in the federal district court.  
There, for enforcing the combination of the literacy test and the grandfather 
clause, Guinn and Beal were both convicted of conspiring to injure black 
voters in the exercise of their constitutional rights.119 
In the process of seeking to hold onto black Republican delegates at the 
1912 GOP convention, and to keep them from electing a Progressive candi-
date, namely Theodore Roosevelt, Taft quietly shifted his position, and wrote 
the U.S. Attorney in Oklahoma to go ahead with similar grandfather clause 
prosecutions.  The 1912 election in Oklahoma was fraught with tension be-
cause the Democratic governor threatened arrest for any federal official who 
“interfered” with the election laws of the state.  The U.S. Attorney Homer 
Boardman wrote a much publicized letter threatening to arrest any (state) 
election official who kept blacks from voting.  Another U.S. Attorney wrote 
the U.S. Attorney General warning “rioting and bloodshed” were probable 
on election day.120  The Attorney General sent back word to hold arrests until 
after the election.121  Such arrests did transpire and resulted in United States 
v. Mosley,122 handed down by the Supreme Court on the same day as another 
grandfather clause case, Guinn v. United States.123  Meanwhile, the grandfa-
ther clause of Annapolis, Maryland had also been ruled unconstitutional in 
federal district court and was headed to the U.S. Supreme Court as the civil 
case Myers v. Anderson,124 eventually to be decided with Guinn.125 
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Once the openly pro-segregation, raised-in-Virginia, Democrat, Wood-
row Wilson, won the presidential election of 1912, the lame duck GOP Jus-
tice Department had good reason to fear that the charges would be dropped.  
It requested an expedited hearing at the U.S. Supreme Court, which it re-
ceived, but not in time to avoid the Wilson transition into office.  The new 
officials, obdurate segregationist, Attorney General James McReynolds, and 
West Virginian Solicitor General, John W. Davis, nonetheless, proceeded 
with the case and even invited amicus briefs from the NAACP and others.126 
One reason that McReynolds may have opted to carry on the litigation 
process is that if Guinn and Beall were simply pardoned, the Oklahoma law 
would remain unconstitutional.  John W. Davis presented able arguments, as 
did the allied briefs, but there remained the chance that the Supreme Court 
would follow the egregious Fuller Court precedents of the Williams v. Mis-
sissippi127 case and two Giles cases, Giles v. Harris128 and Giles v. Teasley129 
to reverse the lower court.130 
Although Guinn was argued in October 1913, it was not decided until 
June 21, 1915. Chief Justice Edward White’s opinion for the Court came 
down as unanimous, and there is no known explanation for this exceptionally 
long delay.  Between the argument and the decision announcement, Justice 
Lurton, who had been severely ill and in frail health beginning on December 
3, 1913, died on July 12, 1914.  He was replaced by Justice McReynolds, 
who had to recuse himself from participation in the decision because of his 
earlier role in the case as Attorney General.  Scholar Benno Schmidt specu-
lates that both Justice Lamar and Justice Lurton wanted to dissent in Guinn 
and Myers, but has no explanation as to why they did not (and rejects the 
suggestion from a son of the attorney who argued for Oklahoma that Chief 
Justice White purposely waited for Lurton to die so as to attain unanimity).131 
Justice Lamar did live to write a dissent in the third black voting rights 
case handed down that day, Mosley v. United States.132  He died shortly there-
after.133 
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The unanimous decisions in both Guinn and Myers rejected the grand-
father clauses for having no other logical motive than to disfranchise black 
voters who were otherwise as qualified, or unqualified, as the white voters 
being grandfathered into the system.134  The at-issue, broadly worded civil 
rights statutes for criminal and civil liability were ruled applicable to Fif-
teenth Amendment rights, along with other constitutional rights, with the 
Court referring to the Mosley decision of the same day for its statutory inter-
pretation reasoning.135  In both decisions, the Court not only struck down the 
grandfather clauses but also struck down the literacy and property qualifica-
tions to which they were attached.136 
Therefore, if the two states wanted to disfranchise blacks, they would 
need to enact new laws.  Oklahoma did so promptly by grandfathering in all 
persons who had voted in 1914, when the newly unconstitutional grandfather 
clause had been treated as in effect.  All other voters were required to register 
during twelve days, from April 30 to May 11, 1916, or, according to scholar 
Michael Klarman, “be forever disfranchised.”137  Without a Justice Depart-
ment eager to attack such laws, this one stayed in effect until 1939.138 
Besides eliminating the literacy qualification in Oklahoma and elimi-
nating the property qualification in Maryland, the Justices in these 1915 de-
cisions were also, to some degree, undoing the goal of those Congressional 
Democrats who, in 1894, had removed from the federal code those statutes 
from the Reconstruction Era that had explicitly enforced voting rights.139  
This judicial interpretation moved protection of voting rights by the federal 
government via civil liability into Section 1979 of the Revised Statutes, and 
via criminal liability into Section 19 of the Criminal Code.  The first of these 
made actionable for civil damages any act under color of law that deprived 
someone of “rights . . . secured by the Constitution and laws.”140  The second 
made it criminal to “conspire to injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate any 
citizen in the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege secured to 
him by the Constitution or laws of the United States.”141  This aspect of the 
Guinn and Myers decisions was by implication the target of Justice Lamar’s 
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dissent in United States v. Mosley, where he objected at length to the Court’s 
undoing of Congress’s known intention of 1894.142 
Mosley, a member of a county election board in Oklahoma had, with a 
fellow board member, deliberately refused to include in the 1912 vote tally 
any votes from precincts known to have allowed sizable numbers of blacks 
to vote (by ignoring the grandfather clause law).  The two had done so under 
instructions of the Democratic Governor and State Election Board, and had 
then been prosecuted by the Republican U.S. Attorney.  Mosley and his col-
league, in contrast to Guinn and Beal, had succeeded in having their demurrer 
to the indictment upheld in federal district court, on the grounds that the 
broadly worded Section 19 of the U.S. Criminal Code did not explicitly apply 
to voting and should not be inferred to do so.  Justice Holmes wrote for the 
(7-1) majority in Mosley, to the effect that the plain words of the statute (Sec-
tion 19) can clearly embrace a joint undertaking by two or more persons to 
interfere with blacks’ efforts to vote.  Irrespective of past intentions of Con-
gress, “we cannot allow the past [to determine] the present.”143 
To anyone familiar with the Fuller Court line of race-related decisions, 
these progressive moves by the White Court on peonage, residential segrega-
tion, and voting rights appear as a startling break.  The Court’s regressive 
momentum on race was certainly halted in the second decade of the twentieth 
century.  However, the White Court did not have revolutionary ambitions.  
Other race-related decisions disappointed black litigants and provided a so-
bering reminder of the limits on what the White Court was willing to accom-
plish. 
III. THE BAD NEWS FOR BLACKS UNDER THE WHITE COURT 
The segregation-limiting McCabe decision of 1914 and the Buchanan deci-
sion of 1917 were bookended by two decisions that honored both private and 
state-mandated segregation practices: Butts v. Merchants and Miners Trans-
portation Co. (1913)144 and South Covington & Cincinnati Street Railway 
Co. v. Kentucky (1920).145  In the first, the Court rejected the claim under the 
Civil Rights Act of 1875 of Mary Butts, a black woman who bought a first 
class ticket for a voyage from Boston to Norfolk, Virginia, but was relegated 
(as were other non-whites) to second class accommodations.  The Court ruled 
unanimously.  Despite the Act’s having been declared unconstitutional in 
1883 solely on the grounds that it interfered with state authority over in-state 
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commerce (such that the reasoning did not plainly cover areas within the ple-
nary control of Congress, such as travel on the high seas), the Act, nonethe-
less, contained no special language directed at interstate commerce, com-
merce in the territories, or on the high seas.  Therefore, its regulations of 
commerce all fell as a whole.146  If Congress wanted to forbid segregated 
facilities specifically in interstate commerce, it would need to legislate anew.
 In the South Covington streetcar decision, the Court’s 6-3 majority 
opined that Kentucky’s law requiring common carriers within the state to 
separate the races by, at a minimum, a “good and substantial wooden parti-
tion” did not impose an undue burden on interstate commerce.147  It is diffi-
cult to see this claim as plausible in light of the following circumstances: At 
issue was a single car streetcar that ran only a six-mile distance, partly in 
Kentucky and partly in Ohio, charged only a single price for the whole length 
of the trip, carried a load of whom eighty percent of the passengers traveled 
interstate, and had to cope with the rule of a contrary Ohio law that prohibited 
racial segregation on streetcars.148 
The dates of the cases, discussed herein, indicate that personnel changes 
on the Court do little to explain the variation in outcomes; racial-progressive 
(and author of the 1914 McCabe opinion) Justice Hughes was on the Court 
for the 1913 Butts decision and did not dissent.149  For the 1920 decision up-
holding Kentucky’s segregated streetcar law as applied to an interstate line, 
Justice Brandeis had already joined Justice Holmes on the Court, and their 
two votes, if added to the dissent of Justice Day (along with the allied Justices 
Van Devanter and Pitney), would have changed the outcome. They chose to 
align with the majority. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
In sum, limited as it was, the White Court’s nonetheless dramatic shift 
toward support for the civil rights of black Americans is not fully explained 
in the extant scholarship.  Scholars have reached no consensus as to why the 
White Court broke, in the way that it did, from the pattern set by the Fuller 
Court.  I have argued here that the shift was a response to a two-fold crisis 
faced by the Court.  The Southern aspect of the crisis peaked in the Shipp II 
trial of 1909.  There, the Justices themselves had to confront directly the 
depth of the lawlessness encouraged by their own lenience (in the Fuller 
Court years) toward Southern states’ flouting of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, 
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and Fifteenth Amendments.  The Northern aspect of the crisis was the devel-
opment of a new form of mob violence, the racial pogrom—anti-black vio-
lence aimed not at a concrete political goal (such as keeping blacks from vot-
ing) but simply at hurting or even killing black people.  These racial pogroms 
erupted in the first decade of the twentieth century, peaking in the immediate 
response to the Jack Johnson boxing match in 1910.  I find it plausible that 
these two shocks would have triggered in the Justices the (accurate) percep-
tion that lawlessness is contagious, and that the time had come for the Court 
to make clear that there are legal limits in this country on what whites could 
do to blacks (as in the peonage cases) and on what Southern state laws could 
mandate against blacks (as in the voting rights cases of 1915 and in the limits 
put on segregation in McCabe, 1914, and Buchanan, 1917). 
The White Court, however, also indicated in Butts (1913) and in South 
Covington (1920) that it was not interested in undoing Plessy v. Ferguson 
(1896), nor in pushing racial integration onto interstate transportation without 
a clear lead from Congress.  The furthest the Justices were willing to go on 
the transportation subject was the line drawn in McCabe (1914), a highly 
formal line at that: under the Fourteenth Amendment states could not legis-
late that it was permissible for common carriers to provide separate and une-
qual facilities for the races (even if usage of first class facilities was highly 
disproportionate by race).  If the railroad companies did so on their own, 
however, the Fourteenth Amendment did not limit them; it limited only ac-
tion by states. 
The constitutional crisis of the early twentieth century did lead to a de-
cisive shift in the meaning of the Constitution as to black Americans, but that 
shift was of moderate dimensions.  Not until the mid-twentieth century would 
all three branches come together to imbue the three postbellum amendments 
with the force needed to appreciably change society. 
